FREE RIDING INSTEAD OF SOLIDARITY: AN ATTEMPT TO INTERPRET HUNGARY'S (ANTI)REFUGEE POLICY IN THE FRAME OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SUGGESTIONS FOR RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

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THE FRAME

HOW TO APPROACH SOLIDARITY RESPONSIBILITY SHARING

THE MATRIX OF FIELDS AND LEVELS OF ANALYS

Field / Discipline Level of	Moral and Political Philosphy	Practical, Political	Legal, Justice-orinted	Social, Sociological, Psychological
State / Community	Responsibility sharing or shifting? Allocation of "burdens"	What is "in the interest of the state?" • ever fewer asylum seekers? • Minimum expenses? • Avoidance of social tensions?	 Compatibility with Geneva 51? Criteria of fairness: Procedural rights Substantive interpretation of definition Material reception conditions 	 Social identity construction of receiving society: why to protect refugees, (or why not) Selectivity according to country of origin
Individual / Family	 Freedom of movement (choice of residence) Decresing vulnerability 	 Can she reach her preferred destination? Where is social integration the smoothest? 	ECHR, Article 3, 8, 13 issues (Torture, inhuman degrading teatment or punishment, right to privacy and family, effective remedies)	 Extended trauma Loss of trust in democracy (and its superiority over authori- tarian regimes)

Possible goals and venues of responsibility sharing/solidarity (or denial of them)

Goals

- Addressing root-causes
- Impact on routes, denial of entry, diverting arrivals
- Harmonisation of rules
- Allocation of persons
- Financial contribution instead of receiving persons
- Sharing of costs and benefits

Venues

- Inter-regional
- Regional
- Subregional
- Bilateral
- Intra-state (e.g. in a federation)

Possible criteria of responsibility sharing/solidarity

Yes

(Yes)

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Applied by	Commission	EU	Commission Dublin recast	
Criterion	COM (2015) 450 final Crisis relocation mechanism	Council Relocation decision	COM(2016) 270 final Corrective allocation mechanism	Germany Kőnigsteini key

Yes

(Yes)

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Total GDP

GDP/fperson

Tax income

Territory

of origin

Population (size)

Population density

Number of earlier applicants

Physical proximity to country

Unemployment

(Neighbour, same region)

Cultural proximity

Possible criteria of responsibility sharing/solidarity


Applied by Criterion	Schmuck 1997	Hathaway & Neve, 1997	Schneider; Engler; Angevendt 2013	
Ciliterion				
Total GDP	Yes (wealth")	No (Yes – external supporter)	Yes (five years average –within EU average)	
GDP/fperson	(Yes)	No (<mark>Yes</mark> – external supporter)	No	
Tax income	No	No	No	
Population (size)	No	No	Yes	
Territory	No	No	Yes (Compared to EU total)	
Population density	No	No	No	
Unemployment	No	No	Yes	
Number of earlier applicants	No	No	No	
Physical proximity to country of origin (neighbour, same region)	Yes	Yes	No	
Cultural proximity	No	Yes	No	

HUNGARIAN ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY IN 2015–2016: SECURITIZATION INSTEAD OF PROTECTION AND LOYAL COOPERATION

APPLICATIONS AND RECOGNITIONS IN HUNGARY

Year	Applicant	Recognised as refugee	Subsidiary protection	Non-refoulement
2000	7 801	197	-	680
2001	9 554	174	_	290
2002	6 412	104	-	1 304
2003	2 401	178	-	772
2004	1 600	149	-	177
2005	1 609	97	_	95
2006	2 117	99	_	99
2007	3 419	169	_	83
2008	3 118	160	88	42
2009	4 672	177	64	156
2010	2 104	83	132	58
2011	1 693	52	139	14
2012	2 157	87	328	47
2013	18 900	198	217	4
2014	42 777	240	236	7
2015	177 135	146	356	6
2000–2015 Total	287 469	2 310	1 560	3 834

PROTECTION IS MINIMAL



ARRIVALS, COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

	I-X. 2015	I-X. 2016	Change	Change in %
Total number of registered asylum seekers	176 580	28 075	-148 505	-84,10%
European	25 146	620	-24 526	-97,53%
Non-European	151 434	27 455	-123 979	-81,87%

Citizenship	I-X. 2016	In the % of all the cases	
Afghan	10 509	37,43%	
Syrian	4 680	16,67%	
Pakistani	3 794	13,51%	
Iraqi	3 303	11,76%	
Iranian	1 250	4,45%	
Moroccan	1 016	3,62%	
Algerian	625	2,23%	
Turkish	420	1,50%	
Somalian	326	1,16%	
Bangladeshi	269	0,96%	
other	1 883	6,71%	
Total	28 075	100,00%	

Source: OIN, Staistics I-X. 2015 - I-X. 2016

www.bmbah.hu (20161208)

DECISIONS IN 2016 UNTIL NOV 1

Number of	decisions	made b	v the Asy	ylum Authority
_ ,			,	

	I-X. 2015	I-X, 2016	Change	Change in %
Acknowledgement as refugee	126	135	9	7,14%
Acknowledgement as subsidiary protected person	295	245	-50	-16,95%
Acknowledgement as person authorised to stay	4	7	3	75,00%
Termination	107 732	46 590	-61 142	-56,75%
Refusal	2 473	3 149	676	27,34%

Source: OIN, Staistics I-X. 2015 - I-X. 2016 <u>www.bmbah.hu</u> (20161208)


CONXCEPTUAL FRAME

Securitisation

Majority identitarian populism

Crimmigration

WHAT DOES HUNGARY DO INSTEAD OF PROTECTING THE REFUGEES?



Hungary: no genuine response to the increased flows with a view to protection. Instead of protection

Hungary does not need livelihood immigrants" title of the parliamentary debate day on 22 February 2015

DENIAL

"National consultation on terrorism and immigration" (May 2015)

"Waves of illegal immigration threaten Europe with explosion...The European Union is responsible for the emergence of this situation... We have the right to defend our culture, language, values...." Parliament's resolution 22 November 2015

DETERRENCE

Reluctant reception and transport to reception centers in 2015
Fence at the border from 15

Systemic detention of asylum seekers

September 2015

Non-access to basic services / inhuman treatment

Unpredictable denial / permission to move on to Austria before the closure

Crisis situation caused by mass immigration, renewed without legal ground in March 2016

OBSTRUCTION

No creation of

and processing capacities / Closing down the largest in Debrecen

new reception

"Transit zones"
with 100/day
capacity –
decreased in
March 2015 to
50

Serbia declared safe third country

PUNISHMENT

Unauthorised crossing the "border closure" is a crime

Ineligible applicants are banned from the EU and detained even if removal is hopeless

Applying to peoplesmuggler rules to volunteers transporting refugees

Unlawful detention of applicants in the transit zone (w/out court control)

Hungary: no genuine response to the increased flows with a view to protection. Instead of protection

FREE RIDING / LACK OF SOLIDARITY

BREACHING THE LAW

Closing of the border (September and October 2015) only rerouted the flow	Building the fence in violation of environmental and nature conservation rules
Waving though approximately 233 000 persons without registration	Violating procedural guarantees in the border procedure (Including the lack of effective remedy)
Attacking the relocation decision in the CJEU in December 2015	Violating rights of minors and access to translation in the criminal procedure
Refraining from resettlement, including under the Turkey – EU deal of March 18	Systemic return to Serbia without obeying the EU-Serbia return agreement
Inititating a referendum against any compulsory relocation scheme	Inhuman conditions in front of the "transit zones"
After the failed referendum failed attempt to amend the Fundamental Law in order to block EU decision	Coercing persons apprehended within 8 kms from the fence with Serbia back across the fence leading to inhuman tratment
	Denying the taking charge/taking back under Dublin

Literature

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Thanks!

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